security_init(9) [centos man page]

SECURITY_INIT(9)						Security Framework						  SECURITY_INIT(9)

NAME

       security_init - initializes the security framework

SYNOPSIS

       int security_init(void);

ARGUMENTS

       void
	   no arguments

DESCRIPTION

       This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.

COPYRIGHT

Kernel Hackers Manual 3.10					     June 2014							  SECURITY_INIT(9)

MAC_TEST(4)						   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					       MAC_TEST(4)

NAME

     mac_test -- MAC framework testing policy

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_TEST

     Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_test_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_test policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework.  Among other things, mac_test will try to catch corrupt
     labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger.  Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various
     MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_test.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_test policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
     entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD
								 December 1, 2002							       BSD