How to use "mailx" command to do e-mail reading the input file containing email address, where column 1 has name and column 2 containing “To” e-mail address
and column 3 contains “cc” e-mail address to include with same email.
Sample input file, email.txt
Below is an sample code where... (2 Replies)
HI,
I am learning the basics of UNIX on my Mac OS X system but whenever I type the "jobs" command I just get the prompt again, with no output. Regardless of how many programmes or activities are processing.
Any ideas? (4 Replies)
MAC_TEST(4) BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual MAC_TEST(4)NAME
mac_test -- MAC framework testing policy
SYNOPSIS
To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC
options MAC_TEST
Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC
and in loader.conf(5):
mac_test_load="YES"
DESCRIPTION
The mac_test policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework. Among other things, mac_test will try to catch corrupt
labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger. Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various
MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.
Label Format
No labels are defined for mac_test.
SEE ALSO mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4),
mac_seeotheruids(4), mac(9)HISTORY
The mac_test policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.
BSD December 1, 2002 BSD