Q-325: gnutls11 Cryptographic Weakness


 
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Special Forums Cybersecurity Security Advisories (RSS) Q-325: gnutls11 Cryptographic Weakness
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Old 12-24-2007
Q-325: gnutls11 Cryptographic Weakness

A flaw in GNU TLS cryptographic package that could allow an attacker to generate a forged signature that GNU TLS will accept as valid. The risk is LOW. Could allow an attacker to generate a forged signature that will be accepted as valid.


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PWMAKE(1)						      General Commands Manual							 PWMAKE(1)

NAME
pwmake - simple tool for generating random relatively easily pronounceable passwords SYNOPSIS
pwmake <entropy-bits> DESCRIPTION
pwmake is a simple configurable tool for generating random and relatively easily pronounceable passwords. The tool allows you to specify the number of entropy bits that are used to generate the password. The entropy is pulled from /dev/urandom. The minimum number of bits is 56 which is usable for passwords on systems/services where brute force attacks are of very limited rate of tries. The 64 bits should be adequate for applications where the attacker does not have direct access to the password hash file. For situ- ations where the attacker might obtain the direct access to the password hash or the password is used as an encryption key 80 to 128 bits should be used depending on your level of paranoia. OPTIONS
The first and only argument is the number of bits of entropy used to generate the password. FILES
/etc/security/pwquality.conf - The configuration file for the libpwquality library. RETURN CODES
pwmake returns 0 on success, non zero on error. SEE ALSO
pwscore(1), pam_pwquality(8) AUTHORS
Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> Red Hat, Inc. 10 Nov 2011 PWMAKE(1)