mac_test(4) [linux man page]

MAC_TEST(4)						   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					       MAC_TEST(4)

NAME

     mac_test -- MAC framework testing policy

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_TEST

     Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_test_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_test policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework.  Among other things, mac_test will try to catch corrupt
     labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger.  Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various
     MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_test.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_test policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
     entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD
								 December 1, 2002							       BSD

MAC_PARTITION(4)					   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					  MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME

     mac_partition -- process partition policy

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy, which allows administrators to place running processes into
     ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC label).  Processes with a specified partition can
     only see processes that are in the same partition.  If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system
     (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).  No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are
     available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

	   partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or ``none''.	For example:

	   partition/1
	   partition/20
	   partition/none

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
     entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD
								 December 9, 2002							       BSD