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security_init(9) [centos man page]

SECURITY_INIT(9)						Security Framework						  SECURITY_INIT(9)

security_init - initializes the security framework SYNOPSIS
int security_init(void); ARGUMENTS
void no arguments DESCRIPTION
This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. COPYRIGHT
Kernel Hackers Manual 3.10 June 2014 SECURITY_INIT(9)

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MAC_TEST(4)						   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					       MAC_TEST(4)

mac_test -- MAC framework testing policy SYNOPSIS
To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file: options MAC options MAC_TEST Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file: options MAC and in loader.conf(5): mac_test_load="YES" DESCRIPTION
The mac_test policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC framework. Among other things, mac_test will try to catch corrupt labels the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger. Additionally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various MAC framework entry points have been called is stored in the security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree. Label Format No labels are defined for mac_test. SEE ALSO
mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac(9) HISTORY
The mac_test policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD. While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. BSD
December 1, 2002 BSD
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