Worm_autorun.vb


 
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Special Forums Cybersecurity Malware Advisories (RSS) Worm_autorun.vb
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Old 12-28-2007
Worm_autorun.vb

This worm may be installed manually by a user.
It drops copies of itself. It drops files/components. It injects threads into normal processes.
It registers itself as a system service to ensure its automatic execution at every system startup. It does this by creating registry keys/entries.
It drops copies of itself in all physical drives. It drops copies of itself in all removable drives. It drops an AUTORUN.INF file to automatically execute dropped copies when the drives are accessed.
It accesses Web sites to download file(s). As a result, malicious routines of the downloaded files are exhibited on the affected system. It then executes the downloaded files. As a result, malicious routines of the downloaded files are exhibited on the affected system.


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CAPTEST:(8)						  System Administration Utilities					       CAPTEST:(8)

NAME
captest - a program to demonstrate capabilities SYNOPSIS
captest [ --drop-all | --drop-caps | --id ] [ --lock ] [ --text ] DESCRIPTION
captest is a program that demonstrates and prints out the current process capabilities. Each option prints the same report. It will output current capabilities. then it will try to access /etc/shadow directly to show if that can be done. Then it creates a child process that attempts to read /etc/shadow and outputs the results of that. Then it outputs the capabilities that a child process would have. You can also apply file system capabilities to this program to study how they work. For example, filecap /usr/bin/captest chown. Then run captest as a normal user. Another interesting test is to make captest suid root so that you can see what the interaction is between root's credentials and capabilities. For example, chmod 4755 /usr/bin/captest. When run as a normal user, the program will see if privilege esca- lation is possible. But do not leave this app setuid root after you are don testing so that an attacker cannot take advantage of it. OPTIONS
--drop-all This drops all capabilities and clears the bounding set. --drop-caps This drops just traditional capabilities. --id This changes to uid and gid 99, drops supplemental groups, and clears the bounding set. --text This option outputs the effective capabilities in text rather than numerically. --lock This prevents the ability for child processes to regain privileges if the uid is 0. SEE ALSO
filecap(8), capabilities(7) AUTHOR
Steve Grubb Red Hat June 2009 CAPTEST:(8)