SETPROCTITLE(3)                                            BSD Library Functions Manual                                            SETPROCTITLE(3)

NAME

     setproctitle -- set process title

LIBRARY

     Utility functions from BSD systems (libbsd, -lbsd)

SYNOPSIS

     #include <sys/types.h>
     #include <bsd/unistd.h>

     void
     setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);

DESCRIPTION

     The setproctitle() library routine sets the process title that appears on the ps(1) command.

     The title is set from the executable's name, followed by the result of a printf(3) style expansion of the arguments as specified by the fmt
     argument.  If the fmt argument begins with a ``-'' character, the executable's name is skipped.

     If fmt is NULL, the process title is restored.

EXAMPLES

     To set the title on a daemon to indicate its activity:

           setproctitle("talking to %s", inet_ntoa(addr));

SEE ALSO

     ps(1), w(1), kvm(3), kvm_getargv(3), printf(3)

STANDARDS

     The setproctitle() function is implicitly non-standard.  Other methods of causing the ps(1) command line to change, including copying over
     the argv[0] string are also implicitly non-portable.  It is preferable to use an operating system supplied setproctitle() if present.

     Unfortunately, it is possible that there are other calling conventions to other versions of setproctitle(), although none have been found by
     the author as yet.  This is believed to be the predominant convention.

     It is thought that the implementation is compatible with other systems, including NetBSD and BSD/OS.

HISTORY

     The setproctitle() function first appeared in FreeBSD 2.2.  Other operating systems have similar functions.

AUTHORS

     Peter Wemm <peter@FreeBSD.org> stole the idea from the Sendmail 8.7.3 source code by Eric Allman <eric@sendmail.org>.

BUGS

     Never pass a string with user-supplied data as a format without using '%s'.  An attacker can put format specifiers in the string to mangle
     your stack, leading to a possible security hole.  This holds true even if the string was built using a function like snprintf(), as the
     resulting string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers for later interpolation by setproctitle().

     Always use the proper secure idiom:

           setproctitle("%s", string);

BSD                                                              December 16, 1995                                                             BSD