MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)					   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 				       MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)

NAME

     mac_seeotheruids -- simple policy controlling whether users see other users

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS

     Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned by other users.

     To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1.  To permit superuser awareness of other credentials by
     virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.

     To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled to 1.

     To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to
     1, and security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group ID to be exempted.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4),
     mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
     entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD
								  October 6, 2005							       BSD