MAC(9) BSD Kernel Developer's Manual MAC(9)
NAME
mac -- TrustedBSD Mandatory Access Control framework
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
In the kernel configuration file:
options MAC
options MAC_DEBUG
DESCRIPTION
Introduction
The TrustedBSD mandatory access control framework permits dynamically introduced system security modules to modify system security function-
ality. This can be used to support a variety of new security services, including traditional labeled mandatory access control models. The
framework provides a series of entry points which must be called by code supporting various kernel services, especially with respects to
access control points and object creation. The framework then calls out to security modules to offer them the opportunity to modify security
behavior at those MAC API entry points. Both consumers of the API (normal kernel services) and security modules must be aware of the seman-
tics of the API calls, particularly with respect to synchronization primitives (such as locking).
Note on Appropriateness for Production Use
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework included in FreeBSD 5.0 is considered experimental, and should not be deployed in production environments with-
out careful consideration of the risks associated with the use of experimental operating system features.
Kernel Objects Supported by the Framework
The MAC framework manages labels on a variety of types of in-kernel objects, including process credentials, vnodes, devfs_dirents, mount
points, sockets, mbufs, bpf descriptors, network interfaces, IP fragment queues, and pipes. Label data on kernel objects, represented by
struct label, is policy-unaware, and may be used in the manner seen fit by policy modules.
API for Consumers
The MAC API provides a large set of entry points, too broad to specifically document here. In general, these entry points represent an
access control check or other MAC-relevant operations, accept one or more subjects (credentials) authorizing the activity, a set of objects
on which the operation is to be performed, and a set of operation arguments providing information about the type of operation being
requested.
Locking for Consumers
Consumers of the MAC API must be aware of the locking requirements for each API entry point: generally, appropriate locks must be held over
each subject or object being passed into the call, so that MAC modules may make use of various aspects of the object for access control pur-
poses. For example, vnode locks are frequently required in order that the MAC framework and modules may retrieve security labels and
attributes from the vnodes for the purposes of access control. Similarly, the caller must be aware of the reference counting semantics of
any subject or object passed into the MAC API: all calls require that a valid reference to the object be held for the duration of the (poten-
tially lengthy) MAC API call. Under some circumstances, objects must be held in either a shared or exclusive manner.
API for Module Writers
Each module exports a structure describing the MAC API operations that the module chooses to implement, including initialization and destruc-
tion API entry points, a variety of object creation and destruction calls, and a large set of access control check points. In the future,
additional audit entry points will also be present. Module authors may choose to only implement a subset of the entry points, setting API
function pointers in the description structure to NULL, permitting the framework to avoid calling into the module.
Locking for Module Writers
Module writers must be aware of the locking semantics of entry points that they implement: MAC API entry points will have specific locking or
reference counting semantics for each argument, and modules must follow the locking and reference counting protocol or risk a variety of
failure modes (including race conditions, inappropriate pointer dereferences, etc).
MAC module writers must also be aware that MAC API entry points will frequently be invoked from deep in a kernel stack, and as such must be
careful to avoid violating more global locking requirements, such as global lock order requirements. For example, it may be inappropriate to
lock additional objects not specifically maintained and ordered by the policy module, or the policy module might violate a global ordering
requirement relating to those additional objects.
Finally, MAC API module implementors must be careful to avoid inappropriately calling back into the MAC framework: the framework makes use of
locking to prevent inconsistencies during policy module attachment and detachment. MAC API modules should avoid producing scenarios in which
deadlocks or inconsistencies might occur.
Adding New MAC Entry Points
The MAC API is intended to be easily expandable as new services are added to the kernel. In order that policies may be guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to ubiquitously protect system subjects and objects, it is important that kernel developers maintain awareness of when security checks
or relevant subject or object operations occur in newly written or modified kernel code. New entry points must be carefully documented so as
to prevent any confusion regarding lock orders and semantics. Introducing new entry points requires four distinct pieces of work: introduc-
ing new MAC API entries reflecting the operation arguments, scattering these MAC API entry points throughout the new or modified kernel ser-
vice, extending the front-end implementation of the MAC API framework, and modifying appropriate modules to take advantage of the new entry
points so that they may consistently enforce their policies.
ENTRY POINTS
System service and module authors should reference the FreeBSD Architecture Handbook for information on the MAC Framework APIs.
SEE ALSO
acl(3), mac(3), posix1e(3), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4),
mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), ucred(9), vaccess(9), vaccess_acl_posix1e(9), VFS(9)
The FreeBSD Architecture Handbook, http://www.FreeBSD.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/arch-handbook/.
HISTORY
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0.
AUTHORS
This manual page was written by Robert Watson. This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Laboratories, the
Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS
research program.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework was designed by Robert Watson, and implemented by the Network Associates Laboratories Network Security (NETSEC),
Secure Execution Environment (SEE), and Adaptive Network Defense research groups. Network Associates Laboratory staff contributing to the
CBOSS Project include (in alphabetical order): Lee Badger, Brian Feldman, Hrishikesh Dandekar, Tim Fraser, Doug Kilpatrick, Suresh
Krishnaswamy, Adam Migus, Wayne Morrison, Andrew Reisse, Chris Vance, and Robert Watson.
Sub-contracted staff include: Chris Costello, Poul-Henning Kamp, Jonathan Lemon, Kirk McKusick, Dag-Erling Smorgrav.
Additional contributors include: Pawel Dawidek, Chris Faulhaber, Ilmar Habibulin, Mike Halderman, Bosko Milekic, Thomas Moestl, Andrew
Reiter, and Tim Robbins.
BUGS
See the earlier section in this document concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experi-
mental in FreeBSD.
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by
entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.
BSD
July 10, 2006 BSD