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mac_none(4) [freebsd man page]

MAC_NONE(4)						   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					       MAC_NONE(4)

NAME
mac_none -- null MAC policy module SYNOPSIS
To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file: options MAC options MAC_NONE Alternately, to load the none module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file: options MAC and in loader.conf(5): mac_none_load="YES" DESCRIPTION
The mac_none policy module implements a none MAC policy that has no effect on access control in the system. Unlike mac_stub(4), none of the MAC entry points are defined. Label Format No labels are defined for mac_none. SEE ALSO
mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), mac(9) HISTORY
The mac_none policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD. While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. BSD
December 1, 2002 BSD

Check Out this Related Man Page

MAC_PARTITION(4)					   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 					  MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME
mac_partition -- process partition policy SYNOPSIS
To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file: options MAC options MAC_PARTITION Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file: options MAC and in loader.conf(5): mac_partition_load="YES" DESCRIPTION
The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy, which allows administrators to place running processes into ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC label). Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the same partition. If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page). No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available. Label Format Partition labels take on the following format: partition/value Where value can be any integer value or ``none''. For example: partition/1 partition/20 partition/none SEE ALSO
mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9) HISTORY
The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. BUGS
See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD. While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. BSD
December 9, 2002 BSD
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