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SunOS 5.10 - man page for ipsecconf (sunos section 1m)

ipsecconf(1M)															     ipsecconf(1M)

NAME
ipsecconf - configure system wide IPsec policy
SYNOPSIS
/usr/sbin/ipsecconf /usr/sbin/ipsecconf -a file [-q] /usr/sbin/ipsecconf -d index /usr/sbin/ipsecconf -f /usr/sbin/ipsecconf -l [-n] The ipsecconf utility configures the IPsec policy for a host. Once the policy is configured, all outbound and inbound datagrams are subject to policy checks as they exit and enter the host. If no entry is found, no policy checks will be completed, and all the traffic will pass through. Datagrams that are being forwarded will not be subjected to policy checks that are added using this command. See ifconfig(1M) and tun(7M) for information on how to protect forwarded packets. Depending upon the match of the policy entry, a specific action will be taken. This command can be run only by superuser. Each entry can protect traffic in either one direction (requiring a pair of entries) or by a single policy entry which installs the needed symmetric sadb rules. When the command is issued without any arguments, the list of (file policy entries) loaded are shown. To display the (spd p.e.s) use the -l option. Both will display the index number for the entry. Note, since one file policy entry (FPE) can generate multiple SPD pol entries (SPEs), the list of FPEs may not show all the actual entries. However, it is still useful in determining what what rules have been added to get the spd into its current state. You can use the -d option with the index to delete a given policy in the system. If the -d option removes an FPE entry that produces multi- ple SPEs, only then SPD with the same policy index as the FPE will be removed. This can produce a situation where there may be SPEs when there are no FPEs With no options, the entries are displayed in the order that they were added, which is not necessarily the order that the traffic match will take place. To view the order in which the traffic match will take place, use the -l option. The rules are ordered such that all bypass rules are checked first, then ESP rules, then AH rules. After that, they are checked in the order entered. Policy entries are not preserved across reboot. Thus the policy needs to be added everytime the machine reboots. To configure policies early in the boot, one can setup policies in the /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf file, which are then read from the svc:/network/initial:default service. See SECURITY for issues in securing this file. ipsecconf supports the following option: -a file Add the IPsec policy to the system as specified by each entry in the file. An IPsec configuration file contains one or more entries that specify the configuration. Once the policy is added, all outbound and inbound datagrams are subject to policy checks. Entries in the files are described in the section below. Examples can be found in the section below. Policy is latched for TCP/UDP sockets on which a connect(3SOCKET) or accept(3SOCKET) is issued. So, the addition of new policy entries may not affect such endpoints or sockets. However, the policy will be latched for a socket with an existing non-null policy. Thus, make sure that there are no preexisting connections that will be subject to checks by the new policy entries. The feature of policy latching explained above may change in the future. It is not advisable to depend upon this feature. -d index Delete the policy denoted by the index. The index is obtained by invoking ipsecconf without any arguments, or with the -l option. See for more information. Once the entry is deleted, all outbound and inbound datagrams affected by this policy entry will not be subjected to policy checks. Be advised that with connections for which the policy has been latched, pack- ets will continue to go out with the same policy, even if it has been deleted. It is advisable to use the -l option to find the correct policy index. -f Flush all the policies in the system. Constraints are similar to the -d option with respect to latching. -l Listing of the internal system policy table. When ipsecconf is invoked without any arguments, a complete list of policy entries with indexes added by the user since boot is displayed. The current table can differ from the previous one if, for example, a multi-homed entry was added or policy reordering occurred, or if a single rule entry generates two spd rules In the case of a multi-homed entry, all the addresses are listed explicitly. If a mask was not specified earlier but was instead inferred from the address, it will be explicitly listed here. This option is used to view policy entries in the correct order. The outbound and inbound policy entries are listed separately. -n Show network addresses, ports, protocols in numbers. The -n option may only be used with the -l option. -q Quiet mode. Suppresses the warning message generated when adding policies. Each policy entry contains 3 parts specified as follows: {pattern} action {properties} or {pattern} action {properties} ["or" action {properties}]* Every policy entry begins on a new line and can span multiple lines. pattern specifies the traffic pattern that should be matched against the outbound and inbound datagrams. If there is a match, a specific action determined by the second argument will be taken, depending upon the properties of the policy entry. If there is an or in the rule (multiple action-properties for a given pattern), a transmitter will use the first action-property pair that works, while a receiver will use any that are acceptable. pattern and properties are name-value pairs where name and value are separated by a <space>, <tab> or <newline>. Multiple name-value pairs should be separated by <space>, <tab> or <newline>. The beginning and end of the pattern and properties are marked by { and } respectively. Files can contain multiple policy entries. An unspecified name-value pair in the pattern will be considered as a wildcard. Wildcard entries match any corresponding entry in the datagram. One thing to remember is that UDP port 500 is always bypassed regardless of any policy entries. This is a requirement for in.iked(1M) to work. File can be commented by using a # as the first character. Comments may be inserted either at the beginning or the end of a line. The complete syntax of a policy entry is: policy ::= { <pattern1> } <action1> { <properties1> } | { <pattern2> } <action2> { <properties2> } [ 'or' <action2> { <properties2>} ]* pattern1 ::= <pattern_name_value_pair1>* pattern2 ::= <pattern_name_value_pair2>* action1 ::= apply | permit | bypass | pass action2 ::= bypass | pass | drop | ipsec properties1 ::= {<prop_name_value_pair1>} properties2 ::= {<prop_name_value_pair2>} pattern_name_value_pair1 ::= saddr <address>/<prefix> | src <address>/<prefix> | srcaddr <address>/<prefix> | smask <mask> | sport <port> | daddr <address>/<prefix> | dst <address>/<prefix> | dstaddr <address>/<prefix> | dmask <mask> | dport <port> | ulp <protocol> | proto <protocol> | type <icmp-type> | type <number>-<number> | code <icmp-code> code <number>-<number> pattern_name_value_pair2 ::= raddr <address>/<prefix> | remote <address>/<prefix> | rport <port> | laddr <address>/<prefix> | local <address>/<prefix> | lport <port> | ulp <protocol> | type <icmp-type> | type <number>-<number> | code <icmp-code> | code <number>-<number> proto <protocol> | dir <dir_val2> address ::= <IPv4 dot notation> | <IPv6 colon notation> | <String recognized by gethostbyname>| <String recognized by getnetbyname> prefix ::= <number> mask ::= <0xhexdigit[hexdigit]> | <0Xhexdigit[hexdigit]> | <IPv4 dot notation> port ::= <number>| <String recognized by getservbyname> protocol ::= <number>| <String recognized by getprotobyname> prop_name_value_pair1 ::= auth_algs <auth_alg> | encr_algs <encr_alg> | encr_auth_algs <auth_alg> | sa <sa_val> | dir <dir_val1> prop_name_value_pair2 ::= auth_algs <auth_alg> | encr_algs <encr_alg> | encr_auth_algs <auth_alg> | sa <sa_val> auth_alg ::= <auth_algname> ['(' <keylen> ')'] auth_algname ::= any | md5 | hmac-md5 | sha | sha1 | hmac-sha | hmac-sha1 | <number> encr_alg ::= <encr_algname> ['(' <keylen> ')'] encr_algname ::= any | aes | aes-cbc | des | des-cbc | 3des | 3des-cbc | blowfish | blowfish-cbc | <number> keylen ::= <number> | <number>'..' | '..'<number> | <number>'..' \ <number> sa_val ::= shared | unique dir_val1 ::= out | in dir_val2 ::= out | in | both number ::= < 0 | 1 | 2 ... 9> <number> icmp-type ::= <number> | unreach | echo | echorep | squench | redir | timex | paramprob | timest | timestrep | inforeq | inforep | maskreq | maskrep | unreach6 | pkttoobig6 | timex6 | paramprob6 | echo6 | echorep6 | router-sol6 | router-ad6 | neigh-sol6 | neigh-ad6 | redir6 icmp-code ::= <number> | net-unr | host-unr | proto-unr | port-unr | needfrag | srcfail | net-unk | host-unk | isolate | net-prohib | host-prohib | net-tos | host-tos | filter-prohib | host-preced | cutoff-preced | no-route6 | adm-prohib6 | addr-unr6 | port-unr6 | hop-limex6 | frag-re-timex6 | err-head6 | unrec-head6 | unreq-opt6 Policy entries may contain the following (name value) pairs in the pattern field. Each (name value) pair may appear only once in given pol- icy entry. laddr/plen The value that follows is the local address of the datagram with the prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the source local/plen address of the packet will be matched. plen is optional. Local means destination on incoming and source on outgoing pack- ets. The source address value can be a hostname as described in getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) or a network name as described in get- netbyname(3XNET) or a host address or network address in the Internet standard dot notation. See inet_addr(3XNET). If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) returns multiple addresses for the host, then policy will be added for each of the addresses with other entries remaining the same. raddr/plen The value that follows is the remote address of the datagram with the prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the remote remote/plen address of the packet will be matched. plen is optional. Remote means source on incoming packets and destination on outgo- ing packets. The remote address value can be a hostname as described in getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) or a network name as described in getnetbyname(3XNET) or a host address or network address in the Internet standard dot notation. See inet_addr(3XNET). If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) returns multiple addresses for the host, then policy will be added for each of the addresses with other entries remaining the same. src/plen The value that follows is the source address of the datagram with the prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the source srcaddr/plen address of the packet will be matched. plen is optional. saddr/plen The source address value can be a hostname as described in getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) or a network name as described in getnetby- name(3XNET) or a host address or network address in the Internet standard dot notation. See inet_addr(3XNET). If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) returns multiple addresses for the host, then policy will be added for each of the addresses with other entries remaining the same. daddr/plen The value that follows is the destination address of the datagram with the prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the dest/plen destination address of the packet will be matched. plen is optional. dstaddr/plen See saddr for valid values that can be given. If multiple source and destination addresses are found, then a policy entry that covers each source address-destination address pair will be added to the system. smask For IPv4 only. The value that follows is the source mask. If prefix length is given with saddr, this should not be given. This can be represented either in hexadecimal number with a leading 0x or 0X, for example, 0xffff0000, 0Xffff0000 or in the Internet decimal dot notation, for example, 255.255.0.0 and 255.255.255.0. The mask should be contiguous and the behavior is not defined for non-contiguous masks. smask is considered only when saddr is given. For both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the same information can be specified as a slen value attached to the saddr parameter. dmask Analogous to smask. lport The value that follows is the local port of the datagram. This can be either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto argument, as described in getservbyname(3XNET) rport The value that follows is the remote port of the datagram. This can be either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto argument, as described in getservbyname(3XNET) sport The value that follows is the source port of the datagram. This can be either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto argument, as described in getservbyname(3XNET) dport The value that follows is the destination port of the datagram. This can be either a port number or a string as described in getservbyname(3XNET) searched with NULL proto argument. proto ulp The value that follows is the Upper Layer Protocol that this entry should be matched against. It could be a number or a string as described in getprotobyname(3XNET). If no smask or plen is specified, a plen of 32 for IPv4 or 128 for IPv6 will be used, meaning a host. If the ulp is icmp or ipv6-icmp, any action applying IPsec must be the same for all icmp rules. type num or num-The value that follows is the ICMP type that this entry should be matched against. type must be a number from 0 to 255, or one of the appropriate icmp-type keywords. Also, ulp must be present and must specify either icmp or ipv6-icmp. A range of types can be specified with a hyphen separating numbers. code num or num-The value that follows is the ICMP code that this entry should be matched against. The value following the keyword code must be a number from 0 to 254 or one of the appropriate icmp-code keywords. Also, type must be present. A range of codes can be specified with a hyphen separating numbers. Policy entries may contain the following (name-value) pairs in the properties field. Each (name-value) pair may appear only once in a given policy entry. auth_algs An acceptable value following this implies that IPsec AH header will be present in the outbound datagram. Values following this describe the authentication algorithms that will be used while applying the IPsec AH on outbound datagrams and verified to be present on inbound datagrams. See RFC 2402. This entry can contain either a string or a decimal number. string This should be either MD5 or HMAC-MD5 denoting the HMAC-MD5 algorithm as described in RFC 2403, and SHA1, or HMAC-SHA1 or SHA or HMAC-SHA denoting the HMAC-SHA algorithm described in RFC 2404. You can use the ipsecalgs(1M) command to obtain the complete list of authentication algorithms. The string can also be ANY, which denotes no-preference for the algorithm. Default algorithms will be chosen based upon the SAs available at this time for manual SAs and the key negotiating daemon for automatic SAs. Strings are not case-sensitive. number A number in the range 1-255. This is useful when new algorithms can be dynamically loaded. If auth_algs is not present, the AH header will not be present in the outbound datagram, and the same will be verified for the inbound datagram. encr_algs An acceptable value following this implies that IPsec ESP header will be present in the outbound datagram. The value following this describes the encryption algorithms that will be used to apply the IPsec ESP protocol to outbound datagrams and verify it to be present on inbound datagrams. See RFC 2406. This entry can contain either a string or a decimal number. Strings are not case-sensitive. string Can be one of the following: string value: Algorithm Used: See RFC: DES or DES-CBC DES-CBC 2405 3DES or 3DES-CBC 3DES-CBC 2451 BLOWFISH or BLOWFISH-CBC BLOWFISH-CBC 2451 AES or AES-CBC AES-CBC 2451 You can use the ipsecalgs(1M) command to obtain the complete list of authentication algorithms. The value can be NULL, which implies a NULL encryption, pursuant to RFC 2410. This means that the payload will not be encrypted. The string can also be ANY, which indicates no-preference for the algorithm. Default algorithms will be chosen depending upon the SAs available at the time for manual SAs and upon the key negotiating daemon for automatic SAs. Strings are not case-sensitive. number A decimal number in the range 1-255. This is useful when new algorithms can be dynamically loaded. encr_auth_algs An acceptable value following encr_auth_algs implies that the IPsec ESP header will be present in the outbound datagram. The values following encr_auth_algs describe the authentication algorithms that will be used while applying the IPsec ESP protocol on outbound datagrams and verified to be present on inbound datagrams. See RFC 2406. This entry can contain either a string or a number. Strings are case-insensitive. string Valid values are the same as the ones described for auth_algs above. number This should be a decimal number in the range 1-255. This is useful when new algorithms can be dynamically loaded. If encr_algs is present and encr_auth_algs is not present in a policy entry, the system will use an ESP SA regardless of whether the SA has an authentication algorithm or not. If encr_algs is not present and encr_auth_algs is present in a policy entry, null encryption will be provided, which is equivalent to encr_algs with NULL, for outbound and inbound datagrams. If both encr_algs and encr_auth_algs are not present in a policy entry, ESP header will not be present for outbound datagrams and the same will be verified for inbound datagrams. If both encr_algs and encr_auth_algs are present in a policy entry, ESP header with integrity checksum will be present on outbound datagrams and the same will be verified for inbound datagrams. For encr_algs, encr_auth_algs, and auth_algs a key length specification may be present. This is either a single value specifying the only valid key length for the algorithm or a range specifying the valid minimum and/or maximum key lengths. Minimum or maximum lengths may be omitted. dir Values following this decides whether this entry is for outbound or inbound datagram. Valid values are strings that should be one of the following: out This means that this policy entry should be considered only for outbound datagrams. in This means that this policy entry should be considered only for inbound datagrams. both This means that this policy entry should be considered for both inbound and outbound datagrams This entry is not needed when the action is "apply", "permit" or "ipsec". But if it is given while the action is "apply" or "permit", it should be "out" or "in" respectively. This is mandatory when the action is "bypass". sa Values following this decide the attribute of the security association. Value indicates whether a unique security association should be used or any existing SA can be used. If there is a policy requirement, SAs are created dynamically on the first outbound datagram using the key management daemon. Static SAs can be created using ipseckey(1M). The values used here determine whether a new SA will be used/obtained. Valid values are strings that could be one of the following: unique Unique Association. A new/unused association will be obtained/used for packets matching this policy entry. If an SA that was previously used by the same 5 tuples, that is, {Source address, Destination address, Source port, Destination Port, Protocol (for example, TCP/UDP)} exists, it will be reused. Thus uniqueness is expressed by the 5 tuples given above. The security association used by the above 5 tuples will not be used by any other socket. For inbound datagrams, uniqueness will not be verified. shared Shared association. If an SA exists already for this source-destination pair, it will be used. Otherwise a new SA will be obtained. This is the default. This is mandatory only for outbound policy entries and should not be given for entries whose action is "bypass". If this entry is not given for inbound entries, for example, when "dir" is in or "action" is permit, it will be assumed to be shared. Action follows the pattern and should be given before properties. It should be one of the following and this field is mandatory. ipsec Use IPsec for the datagram as described by the properties, if the pattern matches the datagram. If ipsec is given without a dir spec , the pattern is matched to incoming and outgoing datagrams. apply Apply IPsec to the datagram as described by the properties, if the pattern matches the datagram. If apply is given, the pattern is matched only on the outbound datagram. permit Permit the datagram if the pattern matches the incoming datagram and satisfies the constraints described by the properties. If it does not satisfy the properties, discard the datagram. If permit is given, the pattern is matched only for inbound datagrams. bypass Bypass any policy checks if the pattern matches the datagram. dir in the properties decides whether the check is done on pass outbound or inbound datagrams. All the bypass entries are checked before checking with any other policy entry in the sys- tem. This has the highest precedence over any other entries. dir is the only field that should be present when action is bypass. drop Drop any packets that match the pattern. If the file contains multiple policy entries, for example, they are assumed to be listed in the order in which they are to be applied. In cases of multiple entries matching the outbound and inbound datagram, the first match will be taken. The system will reorder the policy entry, that is, add the new entry before the old entry, only when: o The level of protection is "stronger" than the old level of protection. Currently, strength is defined as: AH and ESP > ESP > AH The standard uses of AH and ESP were what drove this ranking of "stronger". There are flaws with this. ESP can be used either without authentication, which will allow cut-and-paste or replay attacks, or without encryption, which makes it equivalent or slightly weaker than AH. An administrator should take care to use ESP properly. See ipsecesp(7P) for more details. If the new entry has bypass as action, bypass has the highest precedence. It can be added in any order, and the system will still match all the bypass entries before matching any other entries. This is useful for key management daemons which can use this feature to bypass IPsec as it protects its own traffic. Entries with both AH (auth_algs present in the policy entry) and ESP (encr_auth_algs or encr_auth_algs present in the policy entry) protec- tion are ordered after all the entries with AH and ESP and before any AH-only and ESP-only entries. In all other cases the order specified by the user is not modified, that is, newer entries are added at the end of all the old entries. See . A new entry is considered duplicate of the old entry if an old entry matches the same traffic pattern as the new entry. See for informa- tion on duplicates.
SECURITY
If, for example, the policy file comes over the wire from an NFS mounted file system, an adversary can modify the data contained in the file, thus changing the policy configured on the machine to suit his needs. Administrators should be cautious about transmitting a copy of the policy file over a network. Policy is latched for TCP/UDP sockets on which a connect(3SOCKET) or accept(3SOCKET) has been issued. Adding new policy entries will not have any effect on them. This feature of latching may change in the future. It is not advisable to depend upon this feature. Make sure to set up the policies before starting any communications, as existing connections may be affected by the addition of new policy entries. Similarly, do not change policies in the middle of a communication. Note that certain ndd tunables affect how policies configured with this tool are enforced; see ipsecesp(7P) for more details. If your source address is a host that can be looked up over the network, and your naming system itself is compromised, then any names used will no longer be trustworthy. Example 1: Protecting Outbound TCP Traffic With ESP and the AES Algorithm The following example specified that any TCP packet from spiderweb to arachnid should be encrypted with AES, and the SA could be a shared one. It does not verify whether or not the inbound traffic is encrypted. # # Protect the outbound TCP traffic between hosts spiderweb # and arachnid with ESP and use AES algorithm. # { laddr spiderweb raddr arachnid ulp tcp dir out } ipsec { encr_algs AES } Example 2: Verifying Whether or Not Inbound Traffic is Encrypted Example 1 does not verify whether or not the inbound traffic is encrypted. The entry in this example protects inbound traffic: # # Protect the TCP traffic on inbound with ESP/DES from arachnid # to spiderweb # { laddr spiderweb raddr arachnid ulp tcp dir in } ipsec { encr_algs AES } sa can be absent for inbound policy entries as it implies that it can be a shared one. Uniqueness is not verified on inbound. Note that in both the above entries, authentication was never specified. This can lead to cut and paste attacks. As mentioned previously, though the authentication is not specified, the system will still use an ESP SA with encr_auth_alg specified, if it was found in the SA tables. Example 3: Protecting All Traffic Between Two Hosts The following example protects both directions at once: { laddr spiderweb raddr arachnid ulp tcp } ipsec { encr_algs AES } Example 4: Authenticating All Inbound Traffic to the Telnet Port This entry specifies that any inbound datagram to telnet port should come in authenticated with the SHA1 algorithm. Otherwise the datagram should not be permitted. Without this entry, traffic destined to port number 23 can come in clear. sa is not specified, which implies that it is shared. This can be done only for inbound entries. You need to have an equivalent entry to protect outbound traffic so that the out- bound traffic is authenticated as well, remove the dir. # # All the inbound traffic to the telnet port should be # authenticated. # { lport telnet dir in } ipsec { auth_algs sha1 } Example 5: Verifying Inbound Traffic is Null-Encrypted The first entry specifies that any packet with address host-B should not be checked against any policies. The second entry specifies that all inbound traffic from network-B should be encrypted with a NULL encryption algorithm and the MD5 authentication algorithm. NULL encryp- tion implies that ESP header will be used without encrypting the datagram. As the first entry is bypass it need not be given first in order, as bypass entries have the highest precedence. Thus any inbound traffic will be matched against all bypass entries before any other policy entries. # # Make sure that all inbound traffic from network-B is NULL # encrypted, but bypass for host-B alone from that network. # Add the bypass first. { raddr host-B dir in } bypass {} # Now add for network-B. { raddr network-B/16 dir in } ipsec { encr_algs NULL encr_auth_algs md5 } Example 6: Entries to Bypass Traffic from IPsec The first two entries provide that any datagram leaving the machine with source port 53 or coming into port number 53 should not be sub- jected to IPsec policy checks, irrespective of any other policy entry in the system. Thus the latter two entries will be considered only for ports other than port number 53. # # Bypass traffic for port no 53 # {lport 53} bypass {} {rport 53} bypass {} {raddr spiderweb } ipsec {encr_algs any sa unique} Example 7: Protecting Outbound Traffic # # Protect the outbound traffic from all interfaces. # {raddr spiderweb dir out} ipsec {auth_algs any sa unique} If the gethostbyname(3XNET) call for spiderweb yields multiple addresses, multiple policy entries will be added for all the source address with the same properties. { laddr arachnid raddr spiderweb dir in } ipsec {auth_algs any sa unique} If the gethostbyname(3XNET) call for spiderweb and the gethostbyname(3XNET) call for arachnid yield multiple addresses, multiple policy entries will be added for each (saddr daddr) pair with the same properties. Use ipsecconf -l to view all the policy entries added. Example 8: Bypassing Unauthenticated Traffic # # Protect all the outbound traffic with ESP except any traffic # to network-b which should be authenticated and bypass anything # to network-c # {raddr network-b/16 dir out} ipsec {auth_algs any} {dir out} ipsec {encr_algs any} {raddr network-c/16 dir out} bypass {} # NULL properties Note that bypass can be given anywhere and it will take precedence over all other entries. NULL pattern matches all the traffic. Example 9: Encrypting IPv6 Traffic with 3DES and MD5 The following entry on the host with the link local address fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483 specifies that any outbound traffic between the hosts wtih IPv6 link-local addresses fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483 and fe80::a00:20ff:felf:e346 must be encrypted with 3DES and MD5. { laddr fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483 raddr fe80::a00:20ff:felf:e346 dir out } ipsec { encr_algs 3DES encr_auth_algs MD5 } Example 10: Verifying IPv6 Traffic is Authenticated with SHA1 The following two entries require that all IPv6 traffic to and from the IPv6 site-local network fec0:abcd::0/32 be authenticated with SHA1. {raddr fec0:abcd::0/32} ipsec { auth_algs SHA1 } Example 11: Key Lengths # use aes at any key length {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes} # use aes with a 192 bit key {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192)} # use aes with any key length up to 192 bits # i.e. 192 bits or less {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(..192)} # use aes with any key length of 192 or more # i.e. 192 bits or more {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192..)} #use aes with any key from 192 to 256 bits {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192..256)} #use any algorithm with a key of 192 bits or longer {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs any(192..)} Example 12: Allowing Neighbor Discovery to Occur in the Clear The following two entries require that all IPv6 traffic to and from the IPv6 site-local network fec0:abcd::0/32 be authenticated with SHA1. The second entry allows neighbor discovery to operate correctly. {raddr fec0:abcd::0/32} ipsec { auth_algs SHA1 } {raddr fec0:abcd::0/32 ulp ipv6-icmp type 133-137 dir both } pass { } Example 13: Using "or" The following entry allows traffic using the AES or Blowfish algorithms from the remote machine spiderweb: {raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes} or {encr_algs blowfish} /var/run/ipsecpolicy.conf Cache of IPsec policies currently configured for the system, maintained by ipsecconf command. Do not edit this file. /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf File containing IPsec policies to be installed at the time the system transitions from run-level 2 or 3. If present, these policies are loaded after /usr is mounted but before any non-boot-time routing information is processed and before any Internet services are started, including naming services. /etc/inet/ipsecinit.sample Sample input file for ipseconf. See attributes(5) for descriptions of the following attributes: +-----------------------------+-----------------------------+ | ATTRIBUTE TYPE | ATTRIBUTE VALUE | +-----------------------------+-----------------------------+ |Availability |SUNWcsu | +-----------------------------+-----------------------------+ |Interface Stability |Evolving | +-----------------------------+-----------------------------+ svcs(1), in.iked(1M), init(1M), ifconfig(1M), ipsecalgs(1M), ipseckey(1M), svcadm(1M), accept(3SOCKET), connect(3SOCKET), gethostby- name(3XNET), getnetbyname(3XNET), getprotobyname(3XNET), getservbyname(3XNET), getaddrinfo(3SOCKET), socket(3SOCKET), attributes(5), smf(5), ipsecah(7P) , ipsecesp(7P), tun(7M) Glenn, R. and Kent, S. RFC 2410, The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec. The Internet Society. 1998. Kent, S. and Atkinson, R. RFC 2402, IP Authentication Header.The Internet Society. 1998. Kent, S. and Atkinson, R. RFC 2406, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). The Internet Society. 1998. Madsen, C. and Glenn, R. RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH. The Internet Society. 1998. Madsen, C. and Glenn, R. RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH. The Internet Society. 1998. Madsen, C. and Doraswamy, N. RFC 2405, The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV. The Internet Society. 1998. Pereira, R. and Adams, R. RFC 2451, The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms. The Internet Society. 1998. Frankel, S. and Kelly, R. Glenn, The AES Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec. 2001. Bad "string" on line N. Duplicate "string" on line N. string refers to one of the names in pattern or properties. A Bad string indicates that an argument is malformed; a Duplicate string indicates that there are multiple arguments of a similar type, for example, multiple Source Address arguments.. Error before or at line N. Indicates parsing error before or at line N. Non-existent index Reported when the index for delete is not a valid one. spd_msg return: File exists Reported when there is already a policy entry that matches the traffic of this new entry. The IPsec service is managed by the service management facility, smf(5), under the service identifier: svc:/network/initial:default Administrative actions on this service, such as enabling, disabling, or requesting restart, can be performed using svcadm(1M). The ser- vice's status can be queried using the svcs(1) command. 20 Aug 2004 ipsecconf(1M)