FACCESSAT(2) Linux Programmer's Manual FACCESSAT(2)
faccessat - check user's permissions of a file relative to a directory file descriptor
#include <fcntl.h> /* Definition of AT_* constants */
int faccessat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags);
Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):
Since glibc 2.10:
_XOPEN_SOURCE >= 700 || _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
Before glibc 2.10:
The faccessat() system call operates in exactly the same way as access(2), except for the
differences described in this manual page.
If the pathname given in pathname is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the
directory referred to by the file descriptor dirfd (rather than relative to the current
working directory of the calling process, as is done by access(2) for a relative path-
If pathname is relative and dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD, then pathname is inter-
preted relative to the current working directory of the calling process (like access(2)).
If pathname is absolute, then dirfd is ignored.
flags is constructed by ORing together zero or more of the following values:
Perform access checks using the effective user and group IDs. By default, facces-
sat() uses the real IDs (like access(2)).
If pathname is a symbolic link, do not dereference it: instead return information
about the link itself.
On success, (all requested permissions granted) faccessat() returns 0. On error, -1 is
returned and errno is set to indicate the error.
The same errors that occur for access(2) can also occur for faccessat(). The following
additional errors can occur for faccessat():
EBADF dirfd is not a valid file descriptor.
EINVAL Invalid flag specified in flags.
pathname is relative and dirfd is a file descriptor referring to a file other than
faccessat() was added to Linux in kernel 2.6.16; library support was added to glibc in
See openat(2) for an explanation of the need for faccessat().
Warning: faccessat() is subject to the same kinds of races as access(2) and euidaccess(3).
The AT_EACCESS and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags are actually implemented within the glibc
wrapper function for faccessat(). If either of these flags are specified, then the wrap-
per function employs fstatat(2) to determine access permissions.
access(2), openat(2), euidaccess(3), credentials(7), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)
This page is part of release 3.53 of the Linux man-pages project. A description of the
project, and information about reporting bugs, can be found at
Linux 2012-05-04 FACCESSAT(2)