audit_user(5) [osx man page]

AUDIT_USER(5)						      BSD File Formats Manual						     AUDIT_USER(5)

NAME

     audit_user -- events to be audited for given users

DESCRIPTION

     The audit_user file specifies which audit event classes are to be audited for the given users.  If specified, these flags are combined with
     the system-wide audit flags in the audit_control(5) file to determine which classes of events to audit for that user.  These settings take
     effect when the user logs in.

     Each line maps a user name to a list of classes that should be audited and a list of classes that should not be audited.  Entries are of the
     form:

	   username:alwaysaudit:neveraudit

     In the format above, alwaysaudit is a set of event classes that are always audited, and neveraudit is a set of event classes that should not
     be audited.  These sets can indicate the inclusion or exclusion of multiple classes, and whether to audit successful or failed events.  See
     audit_control(5) for more information about audit flags.

     Example entries in this file are:

	   root:lo,ad:no
	   jdoe:-fc,ad:+fw

     These settings would cause login/logout and administrative events that are performed on behalf of user ``root'' to be audited.  No failure
     events are audited.  For the user ``jdoe'', failed file creation events are audited, administrative events are audited, and successful file
     write events are never audited.

IMPLEMENTATION NOTES

     Per-user and global audit preselection configuration are evaluated at time of login, so users must log out and back in again for audit
     changes relating to preselection to take effect.

     Audit record preselection occurs with respect to the audit identifier associated with a process, rather than with respect to the UNIX user or
     group ID.	The audit identifier is set as part of the user credential context as part of login, and typically does not change as a result of
     running setuid or setgid applications, such as su(1).  This has the advantage that events that occur after running su(1) can be audited to
     the original authenticated user, as required by CAPP, but may be surprising if not expected.

FILES

     /etc/security/audit_user

SEE ALSO

     login(1), su(1), audit(4), audit_class(5), audit_control(5), audit_event(5)

HISTORY

     The OpenBSM implementation was created by McAfee Research, the security division of McAfee Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc. in
     2004.  It was subsequently adopted by the TrustedBSD Project as the foundation for the OpenBSM distribution.

AUTHORS

     This software was created by McAfee Research, the security research division of McAfee, Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc.  Addi-
     tional authors include Wayne Salamon, Robert Watson, and SPARTA Inc.

     The Basic Security Module (BSM) interface to audit records and audit event stream format were defined by Sun Microsystems.

BSD
								  January 4, 2008							       BSD

AUDIT(4)						   BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual 						  AUDIT(4)

NAME

     audit -- Security Event Audit

SYNOPSIS

     options AUDIT

DESCRIPTION

     Security Event Audit is a facility to provide fine-grained, configurable logging of security-relevant events, and is intended to meet the
     requirements of the Common Criteria (CC) Common Access Protection Profile (CAPP) evaluation.  The FreeBSD audit facility implements the de
     facto industry standard BSM API, file formats, and command line interface, first found in the Solaris operating system.  Information on the
     user space implementation can be found in libbsm(3).

     Audit support is enabled at boot, if present in the kernel, using an rc.conf(5) flag.  The audit daemon, auditd(8), is responsible for con-
     figuring the kernel to perform audit, pushing configuration data from the various audit configuration files into the kernel.

   Audit Special Device
     The kernel audit facility provides a special device, /dev/audit, which is used by auditd(8) to monitor for audit events, such as requests to
     cycle the log, low disk space conditions, and requests to terminate auditing.  This device is not intended for use by applications.

   Audit Pipe Special Devices
     Audit pipe special devices, discussed in auditpipe(4), provide a configurable live tracking mechanism to allow applications to tee the audit
     trail, as well as to configure custom preselection parameters to track users and events in a fine-grained manner.

SEE ALSO

     auditreduce(1), praudit(1), audit(2), auditctl(2), auditon(2), getaudit(2), getauid(2), poll(2), select(2), setaudit(2), setauid(2),
     libbsm(3), auditpipe(4), audit_class(5), audit_control(5), audit_event(5), audit.log(5), audit_user(5), audit_warn(5), rc.conf(5), audit(8),
     auditd(8)

HISTORY

     The OpenBSM implementation was created by McAfee Research, the security division of McAfee Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc. in
     2004.  It was subsequently adopted by the TrustedBSD Project as the foundation for the OpenBSM distribution.

     Support for kernel audit first appeared in FreeBSD 6.2.

AUTHORS

     This software was created by McAfee Research, the security research division of McAfee, Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc.  Addi-
     tional authors include Wayne Salamon, Robert Watson, and SPARTA Inc.

     The Basic Security Module (BSM) interface to audit records and audit event stream format were defined by Sun Microsystems.

     This manual page was written by Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>.

BUGS

     The FreeBSD kernel does not fully validate that audit records submitted by user applications are syntactically valid BSM; as submission of
     records is limited to privileged processes, this is not a critical bug.

     Instrumentation of auditable events in the kernel is not complete, as some system calls do not generate audit records, or generate audit
     records with incomplete argument information.

     Mandatory Access Control (MAC) labels, as provided by the mac(4) facility, are not audited as part of records involving MAC decisions.

BSD
								   May 31, 2009 							       BSD